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Summary 
This article provides a critical examination and comparison of the contemporary position of three 
religious minorities: the Muslims in Glasgow; the Sikhs in Novellara and the Kryashens in Tatarstan. 
This is initially accomplished through an overview of the socio-economic, cultural and political 
impact of the religious minorities as three important case studies and through their relationship with 
the dominant form of religion and religious identity. The article will then analyse this information 
and these relationships using two lenses. First, we will use the four types of claims for recognition 
proposed by Koenig (2015): (1) claims for recognition of difference (2); claims for more autonomy 
in public spheres (3); claims for tolerance and (4) call for greater recognition for equal participation 
in organization of the state. Second, we will use the four acculturation strategies proposed by Berry 
(1997): (1) integration; (2) assimilation; (3) separation; and (4) marginalisation. The article will 
conclude with some final comments on gender and youth. 
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Introduction 
This article originates in a series of shared papers and symposia presented by the three authors on the 
topic of the position of minority religious groups in Scotland, Italy and the Russian Federation. The 
papers/symposia were delivered at conferences associated with the ALLMEET project in Bologna 
(20 April 2015), Glasgow (30 June 2015) and Lisbon (23 November 2015). The ALLMEET project, 
co-funded by Tempus, is a collaboration between Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) in The Russian 
Federation and Europe. The project is focused on the topic of cultural integration and, in particular, 
in the HEIs in Russia to enable them to engage with the wider international community. The project 
posed some serious questions about the processes of cultural integration and identified some of the 
key features of cultural integration: language; customs and religion. These key features can also be 
potential barriers to cultural integration. 
 The focus of this article draws on the presentations listed above and examines three case studies that 
explore the impact of these key features of cultural integration. The three cases studies address; the 
contemporary position of the Muslim community in Glasgow, Scotland, the Sikh community in 
Novellara, Italy and the Kryashens in Tatarstan, Russian Federation. There are fascinating 
comparisons and contrasts to be drawn between these three case studies. 
We can gain insights into the contemporary position of a religious minority through the examination 
of their socio-economic, cultural and political impact and through their relationship with the dominant 
form of religion and religious identity. Religious identity in Scotland, Italy and Russia became 
increasingly conflated with the concepts of nation and national identity that were deepened and 
intensified in the 19th century (Nielsen, 1999). In Scotland the religious identity was predominantly 
Protestant and in Italy Catholic and these were often conceived in exclusive terms (Greggs, 2010). In 
pre-communist Russia the religious identity was Orthodox Christianity and was similarly perceived 
in exclusive terms. This conception of religion co-joined to national identity in exclusive terms can 
lead to a one-dimensional concept of culture and a rigidity in forms of identity that can be counter to 
the promotion of social cohesion and inclusion of other forms of religious and national identity 
(Guerreiro, 2005).  
There are intense contemporary debates about the continued privileging of these dominant religious 
groups in Scotland and Italy and the position that they command in the state within contexts of greater 
religious diversity – privileges and positions they are reluctant to surrender or share with religious 
minorities (Nielsen, 199l; Scuderi, 2015). This is juxtaposed with the low practice rate for Christianity 
in Scotland and Italy and the debates on the secular status of the state and the organization of the state 
(Bruce et al., 2004; Pastorelli, 2012; Ventura, 2102). Nevertheless, there remains a residual, if uneasy, 
acceptance that these religious identities, or forms of these religious identities, are still linked in some 
way to national identity in Italy and Scotland. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the Orthodox 
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Christian Church has reclaimed and recovered an important position and role in Russian identity in 
the Russian Federation (Koesel, 2014). The special role of the Orthodox Church has been publicly 
supported by a series of Presidents, including President Putin. 
This chapter will examine the Muslims in Glasgow, the Sikhs in Novellara and the Kryashens in 
Tatarstan and the challenges that they have faced, and continue to face in their local contexts. The 
three case studies have been selected on a number of grounds. The Muslims in Glasgow and the Sikhs 
in Novellara were selected because they are essentially two migrant groups that have arrived, in some 
number, in the city of Glasgow and town of Novellara within the last sixty to seventy years. They 
have a different religion and have brought a distinctive language, culture and sets of customs to their 
new places of dwelling. They are members of a religious minority. They present the opportunity for 
intercultural and inter-religious encounter and dialogue but also, as distinctive from the conception 
of national and religious identity, potential for discord. The Kryashens in Tatarstan have been much 
longer established and do not constitute a recent migrant group but they do constitute a religious 
minority in two respects. First, as Christians, they are a religious minority within Tatarstan where the 
majority of the religious adherents are Muslim. Second, they are a minority branch of Christianity 
within the Christian population of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation and, similar to the Muslims 
in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara, claim a distinctive culture and sets of customs and a unique 
dialect of the Tatar language. Arguably, the Kryashen Christians, at times, are more vulnerable in this 
dual and complex role as religious minority in the local context and minority branch of Christianity 
in the local and national context. The presence of the Kryashens provides the opportunity for inter-
religious, interdenominational and intercultural encounter and dialogue but, as will be seen, is more 
likely to result in discord. 
We will examine: the origins and current population of the minority; the socio-economic, cultural 
and political position of the minority; the tensions and discrimination they experience and their 
relationship with the dominant religion. Once these issues have been examined, we propose to deepen 
the discussion by adopting two analytical lenses. First, the four types of claims for recognition of 
Muslim migrants proposed by Koenig (2015) and adapting them to our three religious minorities as 
claims for recognition. This will facilitate a closer analysis of the three case studies. These claims for 
recognition are: (1) claims for recognition of difference, for example, in dress and of other public 
symbols of religious affiliation (2) claims for more autonomy in public spheres – this can be 
exemplified in calls for religious schooling and permission to convert existing buildings into places 
of worship or construct new places for worship; (3) claims for tolerance that can call for greater 
national recognition of religious holidays and extension of blasphemy laws and (4) call for greater 
recognition for equal participation in organization of the state. 
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Second, we will adopt and adapt the four acculturation strategies proposed by Berry (1997). (1) 
Integration refers to migrants who retain a ‘degree of cultural integrity’ yet also participate in the 
‘wider social network. (2) Assimilation refers to a migrant group that chooses to ‘adapt wholly to the 
host culture while abandoning their original culture’. (3) Separation refers to those migrants who 
retain their own culture and do not aspire to ‘become part of the host culture’. (4) Marginalisation 
refers to those migrants who do not wish to have relations with ‘representatives of their host culture’ 
nor with those of their original culture. We will extend Berry’s theory by arguing for a fifth category: 
(5) segregation and for ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of the different categories. 
 
The Muslim community in Glasgow 
It is difficult to estimate the Muslim population of Glasgow and Scotland until the early twentieth 
century and the later census data of 2001 and 2011 because the historical travellers or migrants to 
Scotland were often identified as being Asians rather than being designated by their religion. There 
is some speculation that Muslim diplomats or traders may have arrived in Scotland before the 
fifteenth century, but there is more concrete evidence of a small Muslim presence from the sixteenth 
century onwards (Mann, 2008). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the number of Muslims 
slowly increased as Scots returning from working and living in India brought their servants home 
with them to resettle in Scotland. During this period, Indian seamen (or lascars) became more 
common in the ports (Dunlop, 2015). On some of the docks in Glasgow, special washing facilities 
were constructed for the Muslim lascars (Prescott, 1992). In the late nineteenth century, a number of 
Indians came to Scotland to study medicine and engineering in the universities and by the early 
twentieth century there were around 300 Indian students in Scotland. In the nineteen twenties, Indians 
became involved in peddling clothing and by the late nineteen thirties there were about 300 Muslims 
in Scotland (Mann, 1992, 2008). In 1944, the first Mosque was opened in Glasgow. In the nineteen 
fifties, Muslims were recruited for unskilled and semi-skilled labour (industrial and transport jobs) 
and their number grew to 3,000 by 1960 (Mann, 2008). The numbers increased steadily to 15,000 in 
1970, 25,000 in 1980 and 35,000 in 1990. Many members of the Muslim community worked in retail 
and restaurants.  According to the Census data of 2001 and 2011, the Muslim population of Scotland 
grew from 42,600 in 2001 to 77,000 in 2011 (0.84% of the population to 1.4%). In Glasgow the 
Muslim population grew from 17,792 in 2001 to 32,117 in 2011 (3.1% to 5.4% of the population of 
the city) (The Scottish Government, 2005; Glasgow City Council, 2013). The Muslims are the largest 
religious group after the Christians in Glasgow and Scotland. 
Despite being a small proportion of the population in Glasgow, the Muslims have established a 
significant presence in the city. This Muslim presence is symbolised by the impressive Glasgow 
Central Mosque that was opened in 1984. This was the first purpose-built Mosque in Glasgow and is 
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the largest Mosque in Scotland. The Mosque operates as a space for worship but also as a centre for 
community activities. Some members of the Muslim community have prospered in retail and the 
catering industry. Members of the Muslim community have played important roles in Scottish and 
Glasgow public life. Notable figures include Mohammad Sarwar, a prominent member of Parliament 
(1997-2010) and members of the Scottish Parliament who have represented parts of Glasgow: Bashir 
Ahmad (2007-2009) and the widely known Scottish Nationalist Party MSP Humza Yousaf (2011-).  
There has been significant discussion in the UK about the question of assimilation or integration of 
the Muslim community since the 1960s/1970s (Weller and Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2015).  Before the 
series of events that began with the riots of 2001 in England and continued with 9/11 and 7/7 and 
November 2015, British identity was beginning to accommodate and include Muslim migrants. After 
these events this became more problematic. There is a perception that Muslims and Asian people in 
general are well integrated in Scotland and have experienced less discrimination than in other parts 
of the United Kingdom. Possible reasons for this perception include the ideas that Scotland is more 
egalitarian than England or religious conflict is focused on the inter-denominational sectarianism 
between Catholics and Protestants and less focused on discrimination against other religious groups 
such as Muslims (Hopkins and Smith, 2008; McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008). It may be that the 
Muslims in Scotland are still perceived to constitute a minority and can be understood to pose no real 
threat to Scottish society (Devine, 2006). There are arguments that Muslims in Scotland are more 
likely to identify as Scottish than Muslims in England associating with national identity (Hussain and 
Miller, 2006). There are many young Muslim people in Scotland who hold multiple identities and 
consider themselves to be, among other identities, both Muslim and Scottish. There was a serious 
terrorist incident on the 30th of June 2007 when a car loaded with gas canisters was rammed into the 
doors of the terminal building at Glasgow airport. It was pointed out at the time that neither of the 
assailants were from Glasgow or Scotland. 
The perceptions of greater integration and less discrimination in Scotland, however, deserve closer 
scrutiny. These perceptions need to be balanced by research which  suggests that Muslims, like other 
religious-ethnic groups, are more likely to be accepted as Scottish if they adopt the prevalent modes 
of behavior and cultural mores of Scottish society (Virdee et al., 2006).  This has the potential to blur 
the ‘otherness’ of the Muslims. Further, the Scottish Government report, Experiences of Muslims 
living in Scotland (2011), reports some significant challenges faced by many members of the Muslim 
community. There have been assumptions that Muslims in Scotland, as in other parts of the United 
Kingdom, engage in forms of self-segregation in particular areas of cities including Glasgow (Ansari, 
2002). This assumption of self-segregation disguises the seriousness of the plight of many members 
of the Muslim community. Many Muslims are located in areas characterized by poverty and 
deprivation and, in fact, the alleged self-segregation reflects the low social-economic status of many 
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Muslims and their lack of choice and lack of social mobility. Muslim women, in particular, have a 
high rate of unemployment at 18% throughout Britain (University of Bristol, 2015). This can be 
attributed to a number of causes. The women may have limited access to child-care. They may have 
limited English language skills. Some employers may be reluctant to employ them because of their 
distinctive dress (the wearing of the hijab). The latest figures for the number of Muslims in prison in 
Scotland indicate that the 201 Muslims in prison are 2.54% of the overall prison population (Scottish 
Government, 2015). This figure is significant because, as has been seen, the overall Muslim 
population of the country is 1.4%.  
There is also recorded evidence of discrimination against Muslims. There has been opposition to the 
construction of mosques in residential (and wealthy) areas such as the Glasgow suburbs of Bearsden 
in 1999 and Newton Mearns in 2001 (Ansdell, 1999; MacKay, 2001). There were repercussions for 
Scottish Muslims as a result of 9/11 and 7/7 and increasing evidence of religiously aggravated 
offences against Muslims. Since records have been kept of religiously aggravated offences, the 
number of police charges for religiously aggravated offences against Muslims in Scotland has 
fluctuated from 19 (2% of all charges) in 2011-2012 to 80 (12% of all charges) in 2012-2013 to 48 
(8% of all charges) in 2013-2014 to 71 (12% of all charges) in 2014-2015 (Davidson, 2015). These 
offences include: breach of the peace; threatening or abusive behavior, assault; offensive 
communications and acting in a racially aggravated manner. There is no separate record for Glasgow 
but, given the Muslim population of Glasgow accounts for almost half the Scottish population of 
Muslims, it can be reasonably assumed that the Muslims in Glasgow have experienced a significant 
proportion of the attacks. The situation has been exacerbated by the highly publicized stories of Scots 
who have become jihadists, though this number is small compared to England. Ruhul Amin, a Jihadist 
fighter from Aberdeen was killed in a drone attack in Syria (Maddox, 2015). Aqsa Mahmood who 
came from an affluent family in Glasgow left for Syria to become an ISIS bride and tries to recruit 
other young Muslim women from the UK (Fantz and Shubert, 2015). There are some Scottish Muslim 
organisations that attempt to counter the misinterpretations of Islam. The Solas Foundation was 
established in 2009, by two Scottish Muslim scholars, to educate Scottish Muslims in mainstream 
Islam with authentic and authoritative scholarship. The Foundation has produced an iSyllabus Islamic 
Studies Course.  
There are reports, however, that discrimination intensified and escalated in the period immediately 
after the attacks in Paris on Friday 13 November 2015. A disturbing number and variety of incidents 
were reported in this period. The Police stated that 64 hate crimes against Muslims had been reported 
in the week after the attack (Diamond, 2015). These may not all be pursued as formal police charges. 
The 2014-2015 Report for religiously aggravated offences was published prior to the attacks in Paris, 
yet the number of offences collated in one week which could potentially be included in the 2015-
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2016 Report almost match the total figure for 2014-2015. On 17th November, a Mosque in 
Bishopbriggs, a small town adjacent to Glasgow, was deliberately set on fire (McCall, 2015). Humza 
Yousaf, the prominent Muslim Scottish Parliament MP based in Glasgow, was subjected to dozens 
of abusive comments on Facebook and Twitter claiming that he supported ISIS (Braiden, 2015). 
There have been death threats targeted at Strathclyde University Muslim Students’ Association in 
Glasgow (Henderson, 2015). There are reports of Muslims, especially women wearing the hijab, 
feeling intimidated in the streets by the hostility of passers-by. Ms Ali, a young woman who wears 
the hijab commented on the hostility she encountered in the streets of Glasgow (Diamond, 2015): 
 
Why should I be afraid? Why should I live in fear? I am one of you. I was born and brought up 
in Scotland. I know no other life. We may be Muslims but we are also Scots.  
 
It appears that the rise in Islamophobia and the related offences resulting from the Paris attacks may 
be more intense than in the aftermath of 9/11, 7/7 and the attack on Glasgow airport (Diamond, 2015). 
However, it may be that Muslims are now more willing to report incidents of discrimination. This 
serious backlash may abate but will potentially resurge in the wake of further attacks on the UK or 
Europe. This raises questions about the fragility of the integration of Muslims in Glasgow and 
Scotland.  
 
The Sikh community in the town of Novellara 
In this chapter the word Sikh refers to the religious persuasion of a group of Indian migrants from a 
specific area (Punjab) and who share a common language (the Punjabi) and a shared history and 
culture (Pashaura and Barrier, 1996). The history of Sikh migration typifies the history of the larger 
Indian diaspora and has been divided into three phases, characterized by different goals and different 
social backgrounds (Dusembury, 1989; MacLeod, 1989). 
The first and second phases, which took place in the nineteenth century and after World War II, were 
characterized by labor migration to more developed countries in Asia and the United States and 
Canada. The third phase began in 1984 and was closely linked to political turmoil between Sikh 
groups and the Hindu Indian central government. During this period Sikhs moved to Italy and other 
parts of Europe. The first Sikhs that arrived in Italy were young men who migrated for political and 
economic reasons.  Some of them found jobs in the circus, others in agricultural activities. Their 
presence in the central areas of the Po Valley has grown considerably since 2000, mainly as a result 
of family reunifications. The town of Novellara currently has 13,690 inhabitants 2,160 of these are 
new arrivals (15.78%). The Indian community (488 people) is the second largest new arrival 
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community after Chinese. The data is significant, considering that in 2002 there were only 167 
Indians (though the number has decreased from 552 in 2012). 
The preference for the town of Novellara, and more generally for the Po Valley, is because it is a 
rural area. This represents an element of continuity with the Punjab. The Punjab has always been a 
largely rural region; the population lives mainly in the villages and the predominant occupation is 
farming. The people who decided to migrate are mostly farmers from the plains of Doaba. Their 
livelihoods were ruined by competition with the large food companies and they were forced to 
abandon their lands. They immediately found employment because of their work skills in the small, 
medium and large farms in the Po Valley. Their ability to work with cattle enabled them to find 
employment in the dairies, in the breeding farms of cows and in the industries that produce Parmesan 
cheese. 
The arrival of the first Sikh immigrants was quite traumatic for the citizens of Novellara. They had 
been used to encountering migrants from southern Italy. The dense network of social ties, traditionally 
based on deep local roots, common traditional cultural references and dialect, was perceived to be at 
risk because of the presence of these new people who have a different physical appearance, language 
and culture. The initial communication difficulties were quickly overcome through interaction in the 
workplace, the provision of language courses for adults and the work of linguistic-cultural mediators. 
Although the men and children speak Italian fluently, the language problem persists for those women 
who have recently arrived for family reunification. For the most part, these women are not engaged 
in work activities, but they remain at home, and have few opportunities for contact and 
communication with local Italian people. The city administration organizes regular Italian language 
courses for them and lessons to prepare for a driver’s license. 
The Sikhs are marked out by their distinctive behavior and mode of dress - both closely related to 
their religious beliefs. The Sikhs pray five times a day, do not eat meat, do not drink alcohol and do 
not consume tobacco. This way of life can present barriers in certain social occasions, especially for 
younger Sikhs and for Sikhs working alongside Italians, in a geographical area that has always been 
renowned for the production and consumption of wine and foods made from pork. Moreover, the 
obligation for Sikhs to wear the kachera (undershorts), grow a beard and to cover their long uncut 
hair under a turban constitute very visual differences. The tradition of carrying the kirpan (dagger, 
the symbol of justice) can be misinterpreted and cause anxiety. Some of the first migrants took off 
their turbans and cut their hair in an attempt to conform with the local norms of dress and appearance. 
The growth and consolidation of the Sikh community in Novellara meant that Italian residents became 
used to these differences and they are now accepted as part of the cityscape (Comune di Novellara, 
2012). 
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A decisive moment for the successful integration of the Sikhs was the construction of the Gurdwara 
temple, opened in 2000. It is the second largest Sikh temple in Europe, attended by about four 
thousand people every Sunday (some Sikhs attend daily). The temple is always open to the public 
and is now one of the major tourist and cultural attractions of the town. Periodically, important Sikh 
preachers from India and overseas come to visit it, attracting thousands of people to listen to them. 
The presence of this temple has facilitated the arrival of new Sikh migrants and is part of the 
municipal policy for the promotion of different religious identities through the support for the opening 
of holy places. In addition to the Sikh temple and the Catholic churches in the town of Novellara there 
are currently two mosques, a Hindu temple and an Orthodox church. The protection of religious 
pluralism was identified early on as a key element to promote the integration of migrants aiming for 
mutual understanding and coexistence among cultures and ethnic groups. This is explained by a 
recent mayor Raul Daoli: 
 
I try to help these religious groups, but without using public contributions. I help them by granting 
them permission to change the function of the buildings they have acquired. We must fight for 
the affirmation of good people; it is not appropriate to send these people to pray in garages or less 
decent places, where extremism and radicalization can be more easily hidden. Beautiful and 
spacious places of worship facilitates the participation of the more educated and forward-looking 
believers, they produce forms of self-control.  
 
The Gurdwara temple is now the main meeting place for the Sikh community of Novellara. Among 
the many religious, cultural and recreational activities organized in the temple and open to all the 
citizens, students and curious tourists coming from other cities, the celebration of Baisakhi in the 
historical center of Novellara is organized in collaboration with associations and municipal 
authorities. The support for shared festivals has been a deliberate strategy launched by the 
administration of Raul Daoli: 
 
In the first phase of my mandate I wanted to promote moments of knowledge, recognition and 
mutual trust. We have identified some places of worship and we have promoted the sharing of 
festivals, perceived as moments of happiness and gratitude, but above all of recognition and trust. 
 
The celebration is considered the heart of the expression of identity of the various communities and 
the time par excellence of being together in a free and jovial mood. The sharing of the festival aims 
to break the religious segregation and self-exclusion avoiding any chance of proselytism and 
syncretism. Other shared celebrations include the end of the month of Ramadan, Christmas, the 
Chinese New Year, Easter, as well as the Republic Day and Women’s Day. 
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The outdoor festivals and the temple have favored integration, newspapers and televisions come 
to document these realities and the work of Sikh people in the dairy. (Erika Tacchini, municipal 
officer). 
 
The presence of linguistic and cultural mediators, the integration projects promoted by schools and 
library, language courses, information points, but especially the frequent opportunities for joint 
planning among the leaders of the Sikh community, the mayor, councilors and representatives of civil 
society have allowed the Sikh community to feel integrated and, importantly, to be recognized as 
integrated. These opportunities for encounter and dialogue between people of different religions and 
cultures have been crucial in this process of integration. 
 The generosity shown to the Sikhs has been reciprocated by the Sikh community, as demonstrated 
by: the presence of some Sikhs in the local pro-loco (local organization to promote the area); the gift 
of an ambulance to the local Red Cross; assistance with the organisation of blood donation in 
collaboration with AVIS (Association of the Italian Volunteers for Blood) and support for the 
displaced persons from the nearby town Finale Emilia, affected in 2011 by a strong earthquake. 
Nowadays many of the children of the first Sikh migrants have completed their education and are 
enrolled at university. They speak Italian more fluently than their parents and have a greater 
understanding of western culture. They have the same ambitions for the future as their Italian peers. 
 
The first Sikhs were employed as farmers. Now the younger Sikh generation that has grown up 
here shares the same ambitions as our children (Erika Tacchini).  
 
Unfortunately, partly because of the economic crisis, there are few job opportunities that can satisfy 
the ambitions of young Sikhs in Novellara. Some of them have returned to India, others are migrating 
to England, the USA and Canada. 
 
My parents are forcing me to go to Canada. I’m trying not to go there but I do not know how long 
I will resist (Singh, leader of the Sikh community). 
 
Kryashens of Tatarstan 
Kryashens are the ehno-confessional group of the Tatar population in the Volga and Ural regions 
(Mukhametshin, 1977; Khalikov, 1978). Kryashens have an independent identity (separate from the 
identity of Muslim Tatars), their own dialect of the Tatar language and their own cultural and religious 
traditions (Orthodox Christian). The Kryashen language is a dialect of Tatar language, but does not 
include words from the Farsi and Arabic languages. A special Kryashen literary language in the 
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Cyrillic script existed till 1930 (Wixman, 1984). Their cultural traditions include distinctive ethnic 
dress and ethnic celebrations. These are different from the cultural traditions of Tatars and Russians: 
for example, the Kryashens celebrate the main Tatar celebration, Sabantyi, in July, while Muslim 
Tatars celebrate it in June. Their religious culture incorporates special Orthodox Christian rituals. 
Kryashens live in separate settlements in rural areas (more than 152 villages in 23 districts) and also 
in the urban areas of Tatarstan (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1985). The Kryashens are the majority 
population in several districts (municipalities) of the Pestrichinskyi, Mamadushskyi, Nizhnekamskyi, 
Zainskyi districts.  
There is some debate about the size of the Kryashens population. According to the Census-2010, the 
percentage of Tatars in Tatarstan is 53.2%. The number of Kryashens is 0.8% of the total population 
of Tatarstan or 1.5% of Tatars in Tatarstan (29,900 people). The official statistical figures for the 
Kryashens in Tatarstan are disputed (Salagaev, Sergeev and Luchscheva, 2011). Estimates put the 
Kryashen population at more than 100,000 Chryashians.  
 
Table 1. Statistic of ethnic structure of the population of Tatarstan, 1989-2010 
Census Share of 
ethnic 
Tatars 
Including share 
of Kryashens 
Share of 
ethnic 
Russians 
Share of 
ethnic 
Muslims 
Share of 
ethnic 
Orthodoxies 
1989 48.5% 10%* 43.3% 49.3% 50.1% 
2002 52.9% 0.9% 39.5% 53.4% 45.6% 
2010 53.2% 1.5%** 39.7% 53.6% 45.2% 
* Estimates of some experts and Kryashen intellectuals. 
** According to estimates the real number of Kryashens is 100-200,000 people, that is 4-8% of the Tatar 
population of the Republic of Tatarstan. 
 
There are three main versions of the origins and history of the Kryashens: 
• The Kryashens are the descendants of a group of Tatars who converted from Islam to 
Orthodoxy after the collapse of Kazan Khanate (mid sixteenth century). The Kryashens are, therefore, 
a consequence of the discriminatory policy against Tatars (Christianization), which was pursued by 
the Russian authorities in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries (Iskhakov, 2002; Nogumanov, 2005). 
• Kryashens are an ancient Turkic group from the Volga region and they have never been 
Muslims (view expressed by some Kryashen leaders and intellectuals). 
• Kryashens have their roots in Finno-Ugric tribes who were under the Turkic influence and 
were pagans before the collapse of Kazan Khanate (view of several leaders of Tatar ethno-
nationalism).  
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These different accounts provoke discussion about the political status of Kryashens. Are they an 
ethno-confessional group of Tatars (official version)? If the Kryashens belong to the Tatars, it means 
that Orthodox Christianity is part of Tatar culture and this challenges the idea of a common Muslim 
identity shared by the Tatar people. Are the Kryashens an independent ethnic group in relation to the 
Tatars? This is the view of several Kryashen leaders and intellectuals, who produced the Declaration 
of Self-Identity of Kryashens as an independent ethnic group and also sent a public note to President 
V. Putin and the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2002-2003 (New Europe, 2008).  
The government of the Republic of Tatarstan promotes the idea that Kryashen and Muslim Tatars are 
one ethnic community and pursues the policy of integration of Kryashens into the regional 
community. The integration of Kryashens is, however, problematic. First, Kryashen identity is not 
homogenous (for example, according to the Census-2002, of the sixteen thousand defining 
themselves as Kryashen, seven thousand self identified as Christian Tatars (or baptized Tatars). It 
means there are two different understandings of Kryashen identity. Second, the marginal groups of 
Tatar harbour xenophobic attitudes and stereotypes towards Kryashens. The term Christian Tatars is 
popular for everyday communication, but it has a negative connotation and is used as a form of latent 
discrimination. Sociological research suggests that there is a greater distance between Tatars and 
Kryashens than between Tatars and Russians (Salagaev, 2006). Alexander Terent’ev outlined the 
results of research that demonstrated that 25% of Tatars do not want to see Kryashens in Tatarstan 
(2013). Tatar etho-nationlists even promote the idea that the Kryashens convert to Islam. The 
Kryashens have been Orthodox for several generations and, understandably, do not support this idea. 
The distance between the Kryashens and the Russians may be less than between the Kryashens and 
the Tatars because of the strong integration into Orthodox Christianity. There is a danger that 
convergence between Kryashens and Russians may mean the Russification and assimilation of the 
Kryashens. During the upsurge of national movements in the 1990s Kryashen intellectuals pushed 
for the withdrawal of the Kryashen Church (i.e. Orthodox churches where services are in the 
Kryashens language) from the Russian Orthodox Church to avoid the Russification of the Kryashens. 
Periodically, some of leaders of the Kryashens protest about the religious challenges that emanate 
from the regional government (the threat of Islamization) and from the Russian Orthodox Church 
(Kryashens want to have more special churches, at the moment they have only six Kryashen 
churches). Kryashens are integrated with the regional political and social system, but they face risks 
of assimilation into the Russian Orthodox Church and into Tatar Islamic culture. The Kryashens are 
less active in promoting their political and economic interests than Tatars or Russians, but they have 
demanded recognition as an independent ethnic group over the past few years. This political struggle 
stalls because the Kryashens do not have an independent political party nor are they an organization 
- the establishment of a separate political party or an ethnic or religious organization is forbidden 
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under Russian legislation. The Kryashen leaders do not appear to have political ambitions but they 
are very concerned to save their identity and cultural traditions. The Kryashens may be classified as 
a disadvantaged group, because of the refusal of regional authorities to recognize them as an 
independent ethnic group. The Kryashens have equal opportunities as citizens of the Russian 
Federation (equal political, social and economic rights). There is no institutional discrimination 
against them in the Republic of Tatarstan. As has been stated, they can encounter incidents of implicit 
racism and xenophobia in everyday life. 
The regional government works to integrate the Kryashens into the regional community. The 
Kryashen Public Organization and young Kryashen organization (Forum of Kryashen young people) 
were established at 2007 with the support of the regional government. These are non-profit, non-
governmental and non-political organizations and these are included in the common framework of 
public ethnic organizations in the Republic of Tatarstan (Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan).  
Kryashens have several folk-art groups for the promotion of Kryashen culture. Kryashen leaders were 
included into the regional system for representation of ethnic groups (House of Friendship of Peoples 
of Tatarstan, the Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan). Sunday schools for children of the Kryashens 
were also created. The Tatarstan Academy of Science has a special Research centre for the study of 
Kryashen history and culture. The regional and local officials always participate in the ethnic 
celebrations of Kryashens. The Kryashen community has a permanent representation at the regional 
and local authorities (it is not obligatory, but it is the wish of regional authorities). The State Council 
of the Republic of Tatarstan (regional parliament) has one member who is Kryashen, the regional 
government includes several Kryashens and there are Kryashen mayors of several municipalities (for 
example Mamadushskyi district, Elabuzhskyi district and others). On the federal (Russian 
government) level the non-formal leader of the Kryashens is Mr. Vasilii Likhachev, who is the 
member of the State Duma (federal parliament) and the vice-president and ex-speaker of Tatarstan 
regional parliament in 1990s. Mr. Ivan Egorov (Head of the large business corporation Ak Bars) is 
the formal leader of the Kryashen Public Organization in the Republic of Tatarstan. The regional 
government took part in special events for the promotion of dialogue with the Kryashens. The 
Tatarstan Government Executive officers supervising the inner policy concerning the Kryashens took 
part on the plenary of Human Rights Organization of Whole World Russian people’s Council in 
Moscow, December 23, 2013. Thus, the regional government respects the cultural traditions of 
Kryashens in Tatarstan. 
The Kryashens face some serious contemporary challenges. These are connected with the future of 
the Kryashen community in the region. There are three possible scenarios for the future of the 
Kryashens. 1) Assimilation with either the Russians or Tatars. There is a danger that the Kryashens 
could be assimilated into the Russian Orthodox Church or Tatar Islamic culture. 2) The conservation 
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of culture and identity of the Kryashens as an ethno-confessional group of Tatars (current situation). 
The conservation of culture and identity of Kryashens will maintain the current position of Kryashens 
in the regional community. 3) The Kryashens will receive a new status as an independent ethnic 
group. This new status of the Kryashen minority will provoke debates about the autonomy of the 
Kryashens and transform the political situation in Tatarstan. The most likely scenarios are the first or 
the second scenario, but the third always remains a possibility. 
 
Discussion 
These are very useful case studies as they illuminate the contemporary position of the three religious 
minorities. The Kryashens are by far the oldest minority, the Muslims have been present in Glasgow 
in numbers for around forty to fifty years and the Sikhs in Novellara are the most recent arrivals. As 
stated in the introduction, we will now adapt and apply the four claims for recognition to all three 
religious minorities: (1) claims for recognition of difference; (2) claims for more autonomy in public 
spheres; (3) claims for tolerance and  (4) call for greater recognition for equal participation in 
organization of the state.  
The first claim for recognition for difference (distinctive dress and other symbols of religious 
affiliation) is applicable to the Muslims in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara but has had markedly 
different consequences. The religious dress and symbols of the Sikhs initially marked them out as 
different to the Italians in Novellara and the kirpan (dagger) was perceived as a weapon and as a 
possible threat. The wearing of the kirpan has been accepted under article 19 of the Italian 
Constitution, as it is an expression of the Sikh religion (Pastorelli, 2012). By contrast, some of the 
religious dress of the Muslims in Glasgow has had the opposite effect in the current climate 
(Diamond, 2015). The hijab identifies a woman as Muslim, as a potential threat, and she is intimidated 
and feels threatened. The distinctive religious dress can be accepted and celebrated as a sign of 
diversity (Novellara) or it can, at times, be used to identify members of the religious minorities and 
can lead to discrimination (Glasgow).  
The second claim for recognition of difference (claims for more autonomy in public spheres) is 
applicable to all three case studies. The Gurdwara Temple in Novellara and the Central Mosque in 
Glasgow link the religious minority with the local community but also with their place of origin and 
other diaspora communities (Gallo, 2012). The Mosque and the Temple also function, as many places 
of worship do for new arrivals, as the focus for wider activities shared by the members of the religious 
communities (Greiner, 2015). The Sikh temple in Novellara has become a focal point for the Sikhs, 
a highly visibly symbol of the presence of the Sikhs in Novellara and has become one of the main 
attractions of the town. Glasgow and the west of Scotland have a more ambivalent attitude to the 
visible physical presence of the Muslims. Glasgow Central Mosque holds a high profile position in 
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Glasgow comparable to the position held by the Sikh temple in Novellara, but plans for some 
proposed mosques have been disputed and a smaller, less well-known mosque was targeted for an 
arson attack after the Paris attacks (Ansdell, 1999; MacKay, 2001; McCall, 2015).  
Similar to religious dress, the place of worship can be accepted and celebrated as a sign of diversity 
or it can be used to identify a visible and accessible target. In Glasgow the Mosque, as a sign of 
Muslim presence and the link of the Mosque and the Muslim community to their origins and other 
Muslims is now perceived to be a threat to national and international security and, to return to a point 
made in the introduction, to the residual, national Christian identity in Scotland (Gallo, 2012). Ms 
Ali, who is quoted above, and other Muslims have constructed their Scottish identity in relation to an 
adherence to Islam and not to Christianity. A sign of the continued autonomy of the Kryashens and 
the maintenance of their separate identity within Russian Orthodoxy is the continued use of the six 
special churches and the possibility of further special churches. This appears to be a source of tension 
and challenge for the Russian Orthodox Church, which has re-established a claim to be a national 
Church and contributor to national identity. This tension is exacerbated for the Kryashens by the 
challenges from the majority Muslim Tatars. 
The use, symbolism and ambivalence of these places of worship create a useful physical metaphor 
for the tensions, negotiations and accommodations for religious minorities. The Sikh temple in 
Novellara has become celebrated as a highly praised and welcome addition to the town. This is within 
the context of the intercultural and inter-religious encounter and dialogue that is actively promoted in 
Noveralla in an authentic inclusive approach. The Mosque in Glasgow is perceived to be both an 
important part of the religious architecture of the city but is also a potential site to be attacked in times 
of heightened Islamophobia. This is within the context of a combination of intercultural and inter-
religious encounter and dialogue but also discord. The Kryashens have six designated Kryashen 
churches which allows them to preserve their distinctive cultural-linguistic form of Orthodox 
Christianity. These are a source of tension with the exclusivist approach of both the majority Muslims 
and the Orthodox Christians. This context of inter-religious and interdenominational discord 
highlights the vulnerability of the Kryashen Christians as a religious minority and as a minority 
branch of Christianity as they strive to maintain their identity and independence.  
The third claim for recognition (tolerance and recognition of holidays) is also applicable to all three 
case studies. The former mayor of Novellara promoted the sharing of Sikh festivals, though this does 
raise issues about the purpose of a Sikh festival and what can be shared with those who are non-Sikhs. 
The Kryashens celebrate Sabantyi on a different date from the Muslim Tatars and this marks them 
out from the Muslim Tatars. It is questionable if Muslims festivals in Glasgow are celebrated beyond 
the Muslim people but there are concessions for school children who are fasting during the month of 
Ramadan. 
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The fourth and final claim for recognition (equal participation in organization of the state) is currently 
applicable to the Muslims in Glasgow and the Kryashens. There is ample evidence of Muslims and 
Kryashens willing to serve in public office – not just to protect their interests, but also to serve the 
common good. There is less evidence of the Sikhs in Novellara holding public office but they are a 
group that has arrived very recently and still represent a small minority. This Sikh community 
presents an intriguing case study and there are a number of reasons why this Sikh community appears 
to be accepted. They are perceived to be good workers who are attentive to their religious duties 
(Pastorelli, 2012). The Sikhs have also contributed to the common good by supporting social welfare. 
Their contribution to social welfare and to the common good indicates that they have resources that 
enable them to make this contribution and they are willing to share these resources.  
The wider social and cultural integration of these three religious minorities can also be analysed using 
theory formulated by Berry (1997). Berry sought to understand patterns in the ways in which migrant 
groups negotiated the issue of acculturation. He identified two main dimensions to acculturation: 
cultural maintenance and contact and participation.  Cultural maintenance refers to the importance 
placed on cultural identity and the preservation of cultural identity. Contact and Participation refers 
to the balance between of being engaged with other cultural groups and being more focused on one’s 
own cultural group (p. 9). Berry formulated four acculturation strategies: integration; assimilation; 
separation and marginalisation. Integration refers to migrants who retain a ‘degree of cultural 
integrity’ yet also participate in the wider social network. Assimilation refers to a migrant group that 
chooses to adapt to the host culture and do not wish to ‘maintain their culture identity’. Separation 
refers to those migrants who retain their own culture and ‘wish to avoid interaction with others’. 
Marginalisation refers to those migrants who do not wish to have relations with the host culture nor 
with those of their original culture.  
Adopting Berry’s theory for our three case studies, the evidence about the Muslim community in 
Glasgow suggests that some members of the Muslim community, through contribution to public 
office, success in business and participation in the labour market, have developed a ‘strong’ level of 
integration, though there are issues about the potential blurring of the ‘otherness’ that may led to a 
‘weakening’ of the integration. Integration in this case is not static but a process that is dynamic and 
can change between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’.  Other members of the Muslim community appear to be 
separated. They do not, however, fit into Berry’s concept of separation as it is not an issue of them 
not aspiring to become part of the host culture – they face barriers to becoming part of the host culture. 
These barriers are socio-economic, religious-cultural and linguistic. We have argued against the use 
of the term self-segregation but now wish to extend the four categories of Berry and we propose the 
term ‘segregation’. Segregation refers to those migrants who retain their own culture and aspire to 
become part of the host culture but face socio-economic, religious-cultural and linguistic barriers. As 
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has been noted above, this is particularly relevant to women. The Sikh community in Novellara 
initially faced a period of ‘strong’ segregation as they appeared to threaten the local host culture. This 
was resolved in many aspects and for many members of the Sikh community this has led to a ‘strong’ 
integration but, similar to the Muslim community in Glasgow, some women remain segregated. The 
integration could be even stronger if the women were not segregated. The Kryashens, though not a 
recent migrant group, are a religious minority and share many of the characteristics of the Muslims 
in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara. The Kryashens have a ‘weak’ and fragile integration and are 
under pressure to move more towards assimilation. The integration is ‘weak’ and fragile because 
there are debates within the Kryashens about Kryashen identity and if they are an ethno-confessional 
group or an independent ethnic group.  
 
Concluding comments 
We would like to conclude with some brief comments about gender and youth. The Muslim 
community in Glasgow and the Sikh community in Novellara are recent new arrivals who migrated 
primarily for economic reasons. There are serious gender and cultural issues for both communities 
concerning the position of women, the language barrier for some women and their segregation from 
the local community and the local workforce (Lum, 2012). This can be contrasted with the younger 
people in the Muslim community in Glasgow and the Sikh community in Novellara who have the 
appropriate vernacular language skills and appear to be more comfortable with western culture and 
are more able to identity with people of their own age group and hold multiple identities. These young 
people are more likely to experience a ‘weak’ level of integration. Kryashen young people have a 
strong sense of religious and ethnic identity: there is evidence of a high practice rate among the young 
and they appear to have a stronger sense of belonging to their minority (Titova et al., 2015).  
There is still much that could be researched about the three case studies, especially in these areas of 
gender and youth. The school education of the children and young people and the retention and the 
continuation of the cultural and religious identity for future generations are important issues. There 
are deeper questions to be asked surrounding the ways in which the multiple identities of the young 
people are constructed and manifested and how these may be affected in times of conflict or crisis 
(Lewis, 2007; Myrvold and Jacobsen, 2015). There are also questions that can be asked about the 
continuation of gender roles for the women in the Sikh and Muslim communities and the social 
segregation of the women (Lum, 2012).  
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